Archive for category Europe
The Quest for Pro-Competitive Regulation in the EU: Who Cares?, by Juan Delgado and Héctor Otero.
The removal of obstacles to competition, especially in highly regulated markets, and the design of procompetitive regulations in response to new market dynamics are essential to mobilize resources and unlock the potential of Europe’s economy. The lack of appropriate policy tools by European institutions and the lack of incentives by national governments, often dominated by vested interests, might prevent the further development of competitive markets in the EU. Increasing governments accountability and consumer awareness on the benefits from competition are ways to make progress in this direction. The empowering of competition authorities to conduct market investigations and to supervise ex-ante the impact of regulations on competition; and the wider use of properly designed public consultation mechanisms provide incentives to governments and legislators to incorporate competition concerns in the regulatory process.
CNMC: The Story of an Unfinished Reform (“La CNMC: la historia de una reforma inacabada“), by Juan Delgado and Héctor Otero. PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA. Regulación y política de defensa de la competencia en España; no. 135. September 2015.
In 2012, the Spanish government proposed the merger of the antitrust authority together with six sectoral regulators in a single authority, the National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC). The reform was justified by the need for better coordination between regulators, to improve the consistency of their respective decisions and to reduce their operational costs. The design of the new institution however does not necessarily guarantee that those potential benefits will be materialized. Improving decision-making mechanisms, creating a more horizontal organization and strengthening the financial and functional autonomy of the regulator would facilitate the generation of synergies that so far do not seem to have arisen.
(Earlier version at IESE Business School. Public-Private Sector Research Center. Occasional Paper OP-259-E, Rev. 4/2014).
Op-ed (In Spanish): El segundo dividendo digital y la gestión eficiente del espectro. Competition Policy International, 24 March 2015.
“Under the current uncertainty about future spectrum demand and given the high costs involved by releasing frequencies from broadcasting to mobile broadband, adopting early decisions on the reallocation of the 700 MHz band might not necessarily lead to a more efficient outcome,” concludes Juan Delgado in the article “Reallocating the spectrum: Should we do it?”.
Interactions Between Climate Policies in the Power Sector, by Paulina Beato and Juan Delgado
Published in “Green Energy and Efficiency: An Economic Perspective“. A. Ansuátegi, J. Delgado and I. Galarraga (eds.). Ed. Springer, 2014.
For the purpose of limiting global temperature increases, governments have designed a broad range of policy instruments in order to reduce carbon emissions such as carbon taxes, carbon markets and renewable energy support policies. Although such instruments aim to serve the same purpose, they are rarely fine-tuned to guarantee their consistency. Carbon markets are in theory the most efficient instrument to reduce emissions. The use of other instruments is justified under the presence of circumstances that undermine the effectiveness of carbon markets such as market design flaws or innovation externalities. In such cases, the optimal climate policy mix should be carefully designed to take into account the potential interactions between policy instruments.
Jueces, Derecho de la Competencia y Economía (Judges, Antitrust Law and Economics) by Juan Delgado.
Nada es Gratis, un blog de economía casi siempre en español.
The recent decision of the European General Court (EGC) on the Intel case is a serious setback to the role of economic analysis in EU antitrust. Although the conclusions of EGC coincide with those of the European Commission, the means to reach them differ. The EGC considers the economic analysis conducted by the Commission superfluous and bases its argument on a purely formal analysis. This means that not only the enforcement of antitrust law in Europe moves away from the international standard, but also it jeopardizes the ultimate goal of competition policy: to promote competition for the benefit of consumers.
Antitrust Damage Actions in Europe: Race to the Middle? by Juan Delgado.
The complexity of antitrust damage actions in Europe, related to the existence of differences across EU countries in key elements such as the limitation periods, degrees of court expertise and specialization, or even the role of economic analysis, makes necessary the development and harmonization of antitrust damage action procedures across Europe. The op-ed “Antitrust Damage Actions inEurope: Race to the Middle?” by Juan Delgado at the Europe Column of Competition Policy International (CPI) (May 14) focuses on the recently passed European Directive on the rules governing actions for damages (the antitrust damage directive) and its implications.
Reflexiones sobre la Iniciativa de Ley de Competencia Económica (Comments on the Proposed Mexican Antitrust Bill), by Juan Delgado
The paper comments on the Proposal for a New Mexican Antitrust Law and compares it with the European Antitrust Legal Framework.