Archive for category Telecoms
CNMC: The Story of an Unfinished Reform (“La CNMC: la historia de una reforma inacabada“), by Juan Delgado and Héctor Otero. PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA. Regulación y política de defensa de la competencia en España; no. 135. September 2015.
In 2012, the Spanish government proposed the merger of the antitrust authority together with six sectoral regulators in a single authority, the National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC). The reform was justified by the need for better coordination between regulators, to improve the consistency of their respective decisions and to reduce their operational costs. The design of the new institution however does not necessarily guarantee that those potential benefits will be materialized. Improving decision-making mechanisms, creating a more horizontal organization and strengthening the financial and functional autonomy of the regulator would facilitate the generation of synergies that so far do not seem to have arisen.
(Earlier version at IESE Business School. Public-Private Sector Research Center. Occasional Paper OP-259-E, Rev. 4/2014).
Op-ed (In Spanish): El segundo dividendo digital y la gestión eficiente del espectro. Competition Policy International, 24 March 2015.
“Under the current uncertainty about future spectrum demand and given the high costs involved by releasing frequencies from broadcasting to mobile broadband, adopting early decisions on the reallocation of the 700 MHz band might not necessarily lead to a more efficient outcome,” concludes Juan Delgado in the article “Reallocating the spectrum: Should we do it?”.
El buen regulador no habla español (The good regulator doesn’t speak Spanish), by Juan Delgado.
Alternativas Económicas, November 2014.
The recent merger in Spain of the antitrust agency and several industry regulators into one single agency poses several questions on institutional design. This op-ed assesses the new institution in relation to the international best-practices.
Integrating Regulatory and Antitrust Powers: Does It Work? Case Studies from Spain and Mexico by Juan Delgado and Elisa Mariscal
Published in Competition Policy International – CPI Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2014
There are a wide variety of possible structures for regulatory regimes in countries. This article focuses on the analysis of multi-purpose regulators that combine regulatory and antitrust powers, such as the Mexican IFT and Cofece, as well as the Spanish CNMC. We focus on institutional design, review the existing literature on the pros and cons of single-purpose vs. multi-purpose regulators, and use the new Spanish and the Mexican institutional settings to contrast how such pros and cons are designed to operate on paper and how they do so in real life. Our goal is to look for evidence, at the very initial stage of the reforms in both these countries, of whether these countries are moving closer to a rule of law equilibrium.
Beyond Reference Markets: Rethinking Electronic Communications Regulation, by Juan Delgado
Published in “Regulatory and Economic Policy in Telecommunications” (No. 8 April 13)
A decade ago, electronic communications regulation was redesigned in Europe incorporating competition law principles. However, while European competition law has evolved from a form-based approach to an impact-based approach, electronic communications regulation remains mostly based on market definition and structural market indicators. The regulatory design should be driven by its impact on welfare balancing the costs and benefits of regulation. A new regulatory approach focused on increasing consumer welfare through the identification of bottlenecks and the promotion of competition and innovation is key to develop the endless possibilities of the electronic communications industry.
La reforma de los Organismos de Regulación (I): Los límites a la integración (The reform of the regulatory agencies in Spain (I): Limits to integration).
La reforma de los Organismos de Regulación (II): Mejoras en la gobernanza (The reform of the regulatory agencies in Spain (and II): Improving governance).
By Juan Delgado, Julio García Cobos and Antón García Díaz.
Nada es Gratis, un blog de economía casi siempre en español.
Regulatory and antitrust agencies must be independent and effective. What is the best configuration to guarantee such independence and effectiveness? In a series of posts, J. Delgado, J. García Cobos and A. García Díaz discuss alternative options to improve the institutional quality of regulation in Spain.
Published in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European Regulatory Framework (P. Buigues and P. Rey, eds., 2004). Edward Elgar Publishing.