Archive for category Non-refereed journals

Please, more Expost Evaluation in Antitrust

Why ex-post evaluation is so important (and so little used) in antitrust, by Juan Delgado and Héctor Otero

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Spring 2016, Volume 1 Number 1

This article explores why the ex-post analysis of antitrust and mergers decisions is important, how it can be performed and what the obstacles to the implementation of ex-post evaluation programs are. The ex-post analysis of competition policy is essential in order to evaluate the extent to which competition policy is being useful to society. Despite the fact that the role of competition policy has become increasingly important throughout the world and the number of competition authorities has grown exponentially, there is still little evidence of the consequences of such phenomena and the extent to which competition policy and Competition Authorities are ultimately helping and benefiting consumers.

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Integrating Antitrust and Regulatory Powers: Does it work?

Integrating Regulatory and Antitrust Powers: Does It Work? Case Studies from Spain and Mexico by Juan Delgado and Elisa Mariscal

Published in Competition Policy International – CPI Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2014

There are a wide variety of possible structures for regulatory regimes in countries. This article focuses on the analysis of multi-purpose regulators that combine regulatory and antitrust powers, such as the Mexican IFT and Cofece, as well as the Spanish CNMC. We focus on institutional design, review the existing literature on the pros and cons of single-purpose vs. multi-purpose regulators, and use the new Spanish and the Mexican institutional settings to contrast how such pros and cons are designed to operate on paper and how they do so in real life. Our goal is to look for evidence, at the very initial stage of the reforms in both these countries, of whether these countries are moving closer to a rule of law equilibrium.

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Estimating Cartel Damages: the Spanish Sugar Cartel

Estimación de daños derivados de la existencia de un cártel: análisis de las Sentencias Acor y Ebro Foods by Juan Delgado and José Antonio García

Published in  “Spain Arbitration Review” (No. 20, 2014)

The possibility to claim damages caused by infringements of competition law is recognized both by the Spanish and European legislations. However, despite of the increasing anticartel activity of the Spanish Competition Authority, antitrust damage actions are rare in Spain. A recent decision by the Spanish Supreme Court against the sugar manufacturer Ebro Foods for damages caused by a cartel in the sugar market partially corrects misconceptions of preceding judicial decisions on the methodology to calculate damages. This article uses the Ebro Foods decision to present an appropriate economic framework for the determination of damages caused by antitrust infringements.

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Comments on the Proposal for a New Mexican Antitrust Bill

Reflexiones sobre la Iniciativa de Ley de Competencia Económica (Comments on the Proposed Mexican Antitrust Bill), by Juan Delgado

The paper comments on the Proposal  for a New Mexican Antitrust Law and compares it with the European Antitrust Legal Framework.

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Disciplining Markets through Antitrust Enforcement

La Mejor Defensa (de la Competencia), un Buen Ataque (Best Defense is a Good Offense), by Juan Delgado

Harvard Deusto Business Review no 227. October 2013

The article explains how firms can detect whether they are being victims of a suppliers’ cartel and what they can do to recover the potential damages caused on them. Disciplining suppliers’ markets is essential to improve firms’ competitiveness.

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The Role of Market Definition in Antitrust and Regulation

Beyond Reference Markets: Rethinking Electronic Communications Regulation, by Juan Delgado

Published in  “Regulatory and Economic Policy in Telecommunications” (No. 8 April 13)

A decade ago, electronic communications regulation was redesigned in Europe incorporating competition law principles. However, while European competition law has evolved from a form-based approach to an impact-based approach, electronic communications regulation remains mostly based on market definition and structural market indicators. The regulatory design should be driven by its impact on welfare balancing the costs and benefits of regulation. A new regulatory approach focused on increasing consumer welfare through the identification of bottlenecks and the promotion of competition and innovation is key to develop the endless possibilities of the electronic communications industry.

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Renewable Energy: The Whys and the Why-nots

Energías Renovables: Por Qué Sí y Por Qué No (Renewable Energies: The Whys and the Why-nots), by Juan Delgado.

PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA. El sector energético español; (2013), nº 134

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Renewable energies are meant to play a leading role in climate policies. All EU member states have put in place policies to promote renewable energies. However, the multiplicity of objectives and the poor design of such mechanisms have limited their impact on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For a proper design of renewables policies, we first need to identify the market failure we are trying to solve. In the case of renewables, greenhouse gas emissions are the «big failure» and technology externalities help to solve such failure.

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