Archive for category Language: Spanish

Restructuring Spanish Regulators

CNMC: The Story of an Unfinished Reform (“La CNMC: la historia de una reforma inacabada), by Juan Delgado and Héctor Otero. PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA. Regulación y política de defensa de la competencia en España; no. 135. September 2015.

Entry blog (In Spanish): La CNMC: Historia de una Reforma InacabadafuncasBlog, 25 September 2015.

In 2012, the Spanish government proposed the merger of the antitrust authority together with six sectoral regulators in a single authority, the National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC). The reform was justified by the need for better coordination between regulators, to improve the consistency of their respective decisions and to reduce their operational costs. The design of the new institution however does not necessarily guarantee that those potential benefits will be materialized. Improving decision-making mechanisms, creating a more horizontal organization and strengthening the financial and functional autonomy of the regulator would facilitate the generation of synergies that so far do not seem to have arisen.


Leave a comment

Power Markets Design

Diseño de Mercados Eléctricos (Power Market Design), by Juan Delgado

Published in “Tecnología, Economía y Regulación en el Sector Energético”. C. Aranzadi and C. López,  (eds.). Academia Europea de Ciencias y Artes/European Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2015.

Starting in the late 80s , the power sector has evolved from a vertically integrated structure, controlled by heavily regulated monopolists, to an unbundled scheme combining liberalized and regulated activities. Given the physical characteristics of electricity, markets do not arise naturally. The creation of power markets relies heavily on the design of the institutional framework and, in particular, the design of (wholesale and retail) markets, the regulation of access to networks and the nature and functions of the system operator. There is not a unique optimal market design. The solutions adopted in different countries differ in several dimensions such as the degree of centralization of wholesale markets, the role of the system operator and the ability of consumers to choose their supplier. These dimensions determine different wholesale and retail electricity market designs .

Leave a comment

The Good Regulator

El buen regulador no habla español (The good regulator doesn’t speak Spanish), by Juan Delgado.

Alternativas Económicas, November 2014.

The recent merger in Spain of the antitrust agency and several industry regulators into one single agency poses several questions on institutional design. This op-ed assesses the new institution in relation to the international best-practices.

Leave a comment

Estimating Cartel Damages: the Spanish Sugar Cartel

Estimación de daños derivados de la existencia de un cártel: análisis de las Sentencias Acor y Ebro Foods by Juan Delgado and José Antonio García

Published in  “Spain Arbitration Review” (No. 20, 2014)

The possibility to claim damages caused by infringements of competition law is recognized both by the Spanish and European legislations. However, despite of the increasing anticartel activity of the Spanish Competition Authority, antitrust damage actions are rare in Spain. A recent decision by the Spanish Supreme Court against the sugar manufacturer Ebro Foods for damages caused by a cartel in the sugar market partially corrects misconceptions of preceding judicial decisions on the methodology to calculate damages. This article uses the Ebro Foods decision to present an appropriate economic framework for the determination of damages caused by antitrust infringements.

Leave a comment

Antitrust Law and Economics

Jueces, Derecho de la Competencia y Economía (Judges, Antitrust Law and Economics) by Juan Delgado.

Nada es Gratis, un blog de economía casi siempre en español.

The recent decision of the European General Court (EGC) on the Intel case is a serious setback to the role of economic analysis in EU antitrust. Although the conclusions of EGC coincide with those of the European Commission, the means to reach them differ. The EGC considers the economic analysis conducted by the Commission superfluous and bases its argument on a purely formal analysis. This means that not only the enforcement of antitrust law in Europe moves away from the international standard, but also it jeopardizes the ultimate goal of competition policy: to promote competition for the benefit of consumers.

Leave a comment

Comments on the Proposal for a New Mexican Antitrust Bill

Reflexiones sobre la Iniciativa de Ley de Competencia Económica (Comments on the Proposed Mexican Antitrust Bill), by Juan Delgado

The paper comments on the Proposal  for a New Mexican Antitrust Law and compares it with the European Antitrust Legal Framework.

Leave a comment

Disciplining Markets through Antitrust Enforcement

La Mejor Defensa (de la Competencia), un Buen Ataque (Best Defense is a Good Offense), by Juan Delgado

Harvard Deusto Business Review no 227. October 2013

The article explains how firms can detect whether they are being victims of a suppliers’ cartel and what they can do to recover the potential damages caused on them. Disciplining suppliers’ markets is essential to improve firms’ competitiveness.

Leave a comment